For more than a year, SANDAG did not disclose an $8.4 billion cost increase facing the projects included in TransNet, its tax-funded transportation infrastructure program approved by voters in 2004.

In an official plan last year outlining the long-term status of TransNet, the agency relied on out-of-date cost estimates that made the program appear to be on sound financial footing.

It’s the latest in a series of moves SANDAG made that hid uncomfortable truths regarding TransNet and another proposed tax hike, Measure A. SANDAG also misled voters in November about how much money Measure A would generate, and recently admitted that an error in its forecasting model had dramatically overstated the revenue expectations for TransNet.

SANDAG finally disclosed the true costs facing TransNet in December 2016. That was 14 months after those cost estimates had been fully updated – by SANDAG itself – and just a month after voters rejected Measure A.

For a year, then, SANDAG’s failure to use the most up-to-date project costs let it obscure the shortfall facing TransNet.

“To follow good policy tenents of fiscal transparency, they should have incorporated the latest cost estimates into their evaluation of TransNet – for sure,” said Lucy Dadayan, a senior policy analyst at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, a public policy research institute at the State University of New York. “Unfortunately, it sounds like this was more of a political gimmick in hopes of passing Measure A.”

We Stand Up for You. Will You Stand Up for Us?

The agency officially acknowledged the new price tag at the same time it conceded that there was a crucial mistake in its economic forecasts that was leading the agency to dramatically overestimate its future sales tax revenue.

Together, the two errors have opened up a $17.5 billion shortfall in TransNet. SANDAG will now need to collect that money from state and federal sources, pass a new tax to cover the difference or scale back the promises made to voters who approved TransNet 12 years ago.

SANDAG project costs

Agency leaders claimed throughout 2016 that Measure A, combined with state and federal funds, would have built another wave of regional transportation projects throughout the county, in addition to those still to be built in TransNet

Nothing, however, would have prevented the new Measure A funds from paying back the old TransNet obligations. Failing to disclose the increased costs in TransNet, and overestimating the anticipated revenues from both taxes, obscured the extent to which that was a distinct possibility.

SANDAG officials pointed to a rolling TransNet financing outline that indicated the program was on track to make good on all of its promises.

But it was that outline, in January 2016, that relied on project cost estimates that SANDAG itself had already changed.


That is incorrect. The plan did not rely on the most recent project cost assumptions for those projects.

Months earlier, in October 2015, SANDAG updated the cost estimates for every project it’s planning to build – including those in TransNet, and many for which it hasn’t locked up a funding source.

That’s when SANDAG approved a new, long-term plan for the region’s transportation needs, called San Diego Forward. Part of that process includes updating all of the cost estimates of projects included in the plan.

But SANDAG did not use those newly updated costs three months later, when it updated the financing plan that tracks whether TransNet was is still poised to meet its obligations.

Instead, it waited until December 2016 to finally incorporate the new project costs. Doing so increased the overall cost of the program by $8.4 billion.


In SANDAG’s own words, it knew in October 2015 when it adopted a new regional plan that the cost of TransNet had increased significantly. It nonetheless continued to rely on out-of-date estimates that made the program appear cheaper for more than a year.

“The more current cost estimates are derived from figures included in San Diego Forward: The Regional Plan, adopted by the Board in 2015,” read a staff report for that meeting. “Previous cost estimates were derived from estimates developed as part of the TransNet Extension approved by voters in 2004.”

Projects get more expensive in two ways. Their price tag can increase due to changes in inflation or the cost of construction.

They can also get more expensive, however, as staff does more work on the project and recognizes new issues that need to be addressed – things like engineering problems, local opposition to a rail alignment or discovering a sensitive species in a habitat the project will pass through.

In a statement, SANDAG said its TransNet Plan of Finance was simply taking old project costs and adjusting them for changes in construction costs. The agency’s regional plan took everything into account, which is why its numbers were much higher.

“Staff had historically used a different methodology for calculating the estimated costs of TransNet projects,” spokesman David Hicks wrote in a statement. “Essentially, the original project cost estimates developed in 2002 in preparation for the TransNet Extension were escalated each year based on inflation. It’s important to note that projects envisioned in the Regional Transportation Plan can evolve and expand as the plan is updated every four years, but the original TransNet project obligations remain the same.”

After Measure A failed, board members asked the agency to provide another status update on TransNet, Hicks said.

“The report included updated estimates of future revenue and updated project costs,” he wrote. “The estimated project costs in the Regional Transportation Plan had diverged over time from the escalated costs of the original estimates (as more detailed design and engineering was done, technology evolved, additional scope was added to projects in the regional plan, etc.).”

That’s when the cost of completing TransNet jumped by $8.4 billion. Specific projects, like a high-frequency bus line in the South Bay, increased in cost from $110 million to $206 million in one shot.

Stewart Halpern, chair of the committee created specifically to oversee TransNet, could not be reached for comment.

Peter Kiernan, an attorney with Schiff Harden who specializes in public finance and infrastructure and who worked as special counsel on those issues for the city and state of New York, said the methodology SANDAG had previously relied on seemed to suggest they had been lowballing project costs all along.

“They did not use best practices,” Kiernan said “You could give them the benefit of doubt and say they made a mistake, or you could be less generous and say they deliberately misled or invited skepticism. In any event, there’s a lacking there and it’s appropriate to point it out.”

He said the mistake is especially egregious because it happened in the run-up to a public vote on a related matter.

“It sounds like they didn’t meet their basic duty to present the best possible information to voters,” Kiernan said. “There’s two groups of people who should be outraged – the board, and the voters.”

José Nuncio, TransNet’s program director, offered another explanation for why the agency didn’t include the most up-to-date costs in the program’s spending plan.

Underestimating the costs, Nuncio said, allowed the agency to show it was on track with all of the projects it hoped to build. By showing that those projects were still on track, the agency could keep doing prep work on them – things like preliminary engineering, environmental surveys and public outreach.

By doing that work, the agency could get the projects to eventually be considered “shovel-ready.” State and federal grant-makers look for shovel-ready projects when they have funds to offer.

In other words, underestimating the costs, Nuncio said, put the agency in a position to be more competitive for outside funding sources than it would have been if it had used the real project costs.

When SANDAG finally acknowledged the real costs for the remaining Transnet projects, it did so at the same time it acknowledged the forecasting error that produced unreliable revenue expectations.

Since that revenue problem had already been in the news, that’s what got the attention – including from Voice of San Diego, which had previously reported the problems with the agency’s revenues.

    This article relates to: Government, SANDAG

    Written by Andrew Keatts

    I'm Andrew Keatts, a reporter for Voice of San Diego. Please contact me if you'd like at or 619.325.0529.

    michael-leonard subscriber

    Let's separate two things.

    Everyone underestimates costs. Companies do it, defense contractors do it in spades, public agencies do it. That's bad, but not illegal.

    OTOH, knowing that you severely underestimated costs that the public must bear and not telling that same public that you knew... that is criminal.

    And yes, kudos once again to VoSD for shining the light. Just be careful not to get too sansationalist-sounding; that's iNewsSource territory. ;-)

    Paul Grimes
    Paul Grimes

    The more I hear from SANDAG, the more it appears to approaching rogue agency status.  The Son of TransNet2 was my first tip off as it appears SANDAG blew through the 30 or 40 years of money in under 10.  Higher costs, union labor rates, poor planning, lower income, fewer people in SD - maybe all apply, but are not an excuse.  

    The agency needs some type of reform as the mostly rubber stamping of bureaucrats initiatives by elected officials isn't cutting it.  While the bureaucrats continually are meeting or trying to obtain funding through various grants, they have lost touch with providing true information while pushing massively expensive projects  - elected officials are not off the hook for not realizing, not asking questions  or possibly conspiring with bureaucrats to deceive the public.    

    My latest contact was being chosen "at random" for their transportation survey.  I have received no fewer than 4 USPS letters/postcards urging me to take the survey, where I will receive $10 and then $20 gift cards to complete the survey and Nielsen ratings type travel log for a week.  

    Starting the survey, it was getting personal real quick.  Make, year model of all cars, how many bikes do you own.  But, when it asked me my height and weight, I immediately shut my browser and not because I'm apologetic about my height and weight but because it's compromises my privacy unnecessary and will turn off many others as well.  The information is not in any way anonymous as you need to enter a code SANDAG asigns to each participant.

    Calls to the 844 number end you up in Kansas, where you need to listen to a 30 second plus message in English, followed by a 30 plus second message in Spanish before you can be connected of leave a message with the contractor.    

    Carolyn Chase
    Carolyn Chase subscriber

    So ..... lying about project costs to state and federal funders helps get funds. This goes back a long way, but in the past it's always been chocked up to that planning adage - you can't always predict the future, they were just doing their best professional guesstimates. In this case, however, they've been caught on a timeline lying on a public ballot measure on both sides of the estimates - income and costs. We should not be so forgiving of this pattern.

    Allen Carter
    Allen Carter subscriber

    " conceded that there was a crucial mistake..."

    These are the sort of "mistakes" that should put someone in prison. "Crimes" is the correct word for this stuff. 

    La Playa Heritage
    La Playa Heritage subscribermember

    Wow!  Great Reporting. Renewing VOSD Membership today.

    More troubling than financial misrepresentation is SANDAG's refusal to solve seismic hazard problems, and fake legal, financial, and engineering documents in order to not make waves, in order to be in conformance and score high on Competitive Grant Applications for free Federal and State Funds for Transportation projects.

    SANDAG staff literally hid scientific evidence and huge costs increase from the Board, by delaying the release of 2015 active fault investigation reports. Staff stated if they acknowledged the cost increasing due to project Redesigns, they would not have the opportunity to compete at the State  and Federal levels that is only available to Shovel Ready Projects. 

    For example, listen to the audio of the SANDAG Board of Director's Meeting on December 12, 2016,  Item 12 Proposed FY-2017 Program Budget Amendment: Elvira to Morena Double Track.  

    The $84 million, +11.5% cost Increase in the Budget mostly due to hiding scientific evidence of active faulting, hiding known Fault Rupture Zones. 

    And hiding cost increases to to redesign foundations and retaining walls.  

    Audio Start Time 1 Hour,   4 to 11 Minutes. of Directors&mType=Regular Session&mDate=12/16/2016

    Listen to Gary Gallegos, who speaks 1 Hour 8 Minutes as part of Councilmember Carrie Downey testimony.  Please investigate. 

    John Porter
    John Porter subscriber

    Yesterday a pothole in San Diego almost ripped the wheels off my wife's car.  Two more "no" votes on anything this cockamamie organization proposes...

    Elmer Walker
    Elmer Walker subscriber

    These are serious violations and should have appropriate punishment.For starters, all those who knew or should have known should be thrown out of office or terminated with no benefits. There should also be a thorough investigation for violation of law and if appropriate they should be prosecuted. Too often crimes like this are just glossed over with no punishment or adverse effect.